This project is funded by a British Academy Newton Advanced Fellowship (30 September 2018 - 30 August 2022)
The PIs are Veli Mitova from the University of Johannesburg, and Lubomira Radoilska from the University of Kent.
The project's research assistant and MA bursary recipient is Abraham Tobi from the University of Johannesburg.
The PIs are Veli Mitova from the University of Johannesburg, and Lubomira Radoilska from the University of Kent.
The project's research assistant and MA bursary recipient is Abraham Tobi from the University of Johannesburg.
Background
How should we understand epistemic injustice? Most theorists concerned with this question employ the framework of virtue epistemology to answer it. We suggest that we would gain much from thinking about it, in addition, through the lens of the relationship between epistemic reasons and agency.
To see how this might work, consider the following example. Suppose that Lindiwe complains to Joe that he isn’t supportive enough in her career. Suppose further that she is both correct and justified in thinking as she does, but that Joe shrugs her off by saying that she only believes this because she (like all girls) is overly emotional and sensitive. I think most of us would agree on two things: that Joe’s explanation of Lindiwe’s belief is unjust; and that such injustice is the bread and butter of sexist, racist, and other X-ist discourse.
We can describe the injustice in three ways, revealing the intuitive connections amongst epistemic injustice, reasons, and agency. First, it is an epistemic injustice in virtue of demeaning Lindiwe in her capacity as knower: Joe’s explanation represents her as not being in a position to know that Joe is not supportive. Second, it does so by putting her outside the space of reasons: it is because the belief is seen as not based on any reasons that she isn’t in a position to know. And third, this amounts to disempowering Lindiwe by denying her epistemic agency, that is, denying her responsibility for, and rational authority over, her belief.
Aims
The project has three main aims, corresponding to its three key notions.
Central Hypothesis
Our central hypothesis is this. Further to already identified strands of epistemic injustice, e.g. testimonial and hermeneutic, there is a more fundamental type, which affects unprivileged knowers as agents across the board. Its pervasive effects are due to the fact that unprivileged knowers’ reasons for action and belief are treated as being ‘of the wrong kind’ by the default. In other words, their reasons are conceived as explanatory at best, but not as potential justifications. The upshot is to undermine agency overall since, in an important sense, unprivileged knowers are denied knowledge of what they are doing. Instead, privileged observers or critics are assumed to have better understanding of what such knowers are up to. This underexplored yet insidious mechanism of epistemic injustice paves the way for two related epistemic wrongs: (1) misappropriating the voice of unprivileged knowers and (2) dispossessing them from past achievements and future initiatives.
How should we understand epistemic injustice? Most theorists concerned with this question employ the framework of virtue epistemology to answer it. We suggest that we would gain much from thinking about it, in addition, through the lens of the relationship between epistemic reasons and agency.
To see how this might work, consider the following example. Suppose that Lindiwe complains to Joe that he isn’t supportive enough in her career. Suppose further that she is both correct and justified in thinking as she does, but that Joe shrugs her off by saying that she only believes this because she (like all girls) is overly emotional and sensitive. I think most of us would agree on two things: that Joe’s explanation of Lindiwe’s belief is unjust; and that such injustice is the bread and butter of sexist, racist, and other X-ist discourse.
We can describe the injustice in three ways, revealing the intuitive connections amongst epistemic injustice, reasons, and agency. First, it is an epistemic injustice in virtue of demeaning Lindiwe in her capacity as knower: Joe’s explanation represents her as not being in a position to know that Joe is not supportive. Second, it does so by putting her outside the space of reasons: it is because the belief is seen as not based on any reasons that she isn’t in a position to know. And third, this amounts to disempowering Lindiwe by denying her epistemic agency, that is, denying her responsibility for, and rational authority over, her belief.
Aims
The project has three main aims, corresponding to its three key notions.
- The first, and principal, aim is to better understand epistemic injustice by putting it in dialogue with the debates on reasons and agency.
- The second aim is to shed light on the power-dynamics of reasons-ascriptions, in particular on how ascribing certain kinds of epistemic reasons empowers, while ascribing others disempowers.
- The final aim is to illuminate the notion of epistemic agency by exploring two connections – between responsibility and epistemic injustice, and between the attributions of reasons and attributions of responsibility.
Central Hypothesis
Our central hypothesis is this. Further to already identified strands of epistemic injustice, e.g. testimonial and hermeneutic, there is a more fundamental type, which affects unprivileged knowers as agents across the board. Its pervasive effects are due to the fact that unprivileged knowers’ reasons for action and belief are treated as being ‘of the wrong kind’ by the default. In other words, their reasons are conceived as explanatory at best, but not as potential justifications. The upshot is to undermine agency overall since, in an important sense, unprivileged knowers are denied knowledge of what they are doing. Instead, privileged observers or critics are assumed to have better understanding of what such knowers are up to. This underexplored yet insidious mechanism of epistemic injustice paves the way for two related epistemic wrongs: (1) misappropriating the voice of unprivileged knowers and (2) dispossessing them from past achievements and future initiatives.
