Mitova, V. (forthcoming). Taking the Sociality of Knowledge Seriously. Asian Journal of Philosophy.
Mitova, V. (2021). A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth. Erkenntnis. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-021-00435-4.
Mitova, V. (2021). How to Decolonise Knowledge without Too Much Relativism. In Khumalo, S. (Ed.) Decolonisation as Democratisation. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
Mitova, V. (Ed.) (2020). Epistemic Decolonisation. Special Issue of Philosophical Papers, 49(2).
Mitova, V. (2020). Decolonising Knowledge Here and Now. Philosophical Papers, 49(2), 191-212.
Mitova, V. (2020). Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(5), 707-722.
Mitova, V. (2021). How to Decolonise Knowledge without Too Much Relativism. In Khumalo, S. (Ed.) Decolonisation as Democratisation. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
Radoilska, L. (forthcoming). Is Grit Irrational for Akratic Agents?, in Evans, N. H. & McKearney, P. (Eds.), Against Better Judgment: Akrasia in Anthropological Perspective. Oxford: Berghan Books.
Radoilska, L. (2021). Pathologies of Agency, in Ferrero, L. (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Agency. Routledge.
Radoilska, L. (2021). Circumstance, Answerability and Luck. The Monist, 104(2), 155–167, https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa029.
Radoilska, L. (2021). Distinguishing Value-Neutrality from Value-Independence: Toward a New Disentangling Strategy for Moral Epistemology, in McBride, M. and Kurki, V. A. (Eds.), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer. Oxford University Press.
Radoilska, L. (ed.) (2020). Epistemic Injustice and Agency. Special Issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23(5).
Tobi, A. (2020). Towards a Plausible Account of Epistemic Decolonisation. Philosophical Papers, 49, 253-278.
Mitova, V. (2021). A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth. Erkenntnis. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-021-00435-4.
Mitova, V. (2021). How to Decolonise Knowledge without Too Much Relativism. In Khumalo, S. (Ed.) Decolonisation as Democratisation. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
Mitova, V. (Ed.) (2020). Epistemic Decolonisation. Special Issue of Philosophical Papers, 49(2).
Mitova, V. (2020). Decolonising Knowledge Here and Now. Philosophical Papers, 49(2), 191-212.
Mitova, V. (2020). Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(5), 707-722.
Mitova, V. (2021). How to Decolonise Knowledge without Too Much Relativism. In Khumalo, S. (Ed.) Decolonisation as Democratisation. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
Radoilska, L. (forthcoming). Is Grit Irrational for Akratic Agents?, in Evans, N. H. & McKearney, P. (Eds.), Against Better Judgment: Akrasia in Anthropological Perspective. Oxford: Berghan Books.
Radoilska, L. (2021). Pathologies of Agency, in Ferrero, L. (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Agency. Routledge.
Radoilska, L. (2021). Circumstance, Answerability and Luck. The Monist, 104(2), 155–167, https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa029.
Radoilska, L. (2021). Distinguishing Value-Neutrality from Value-Independence: Toward a New Disentangling Strategy for Moral Epistemology, in McBride, M. and Kurki, V. A. (Eds.), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer. Oxford University Press.
Radoilska, L. (ed.) (2020). Epistemic Injustice and Agency. Special Issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23(5).
Tobi, A. (2020). Towards a Plausible Account of Epistemic Decolonisation. Philosophical Papers, 49, 253-278.